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COMMENT

JAMMING THE REVOLVING DOOR:
LEGISLATIVE SETBACKS FOR MENTAL HEALTH COURT SYSTEMS IN
VIRGINIA
Sheila Moheb *
I. INTRODUCTION
Mental health courts (“MHCs”) have emerged throughout the United
States in response to the overwhelming number of individuals with mental
illness in the criminal justice system. Many individuals with mental illness
who lack the social and financial resources necessary to receive treatment
find themselves charged with criminal offenses. Often times, their arrests
are more a product of mental illness than of criminality. 1 The growing
presence of criminal defendants with mental illness imposes financial
hardships upon the criminal justice system, while ill-equipped and
overcrowded jails provide inadequate treatment for inmates with mental
health problems. 2 Accordingly, both the criminal justice system and
mentally ill offenders have suffered from the adverse effects that arise from
budgetary constraints and inept staffing of community-based mental health
care services.
Proponents of MHCs assert that alternative court systems will provide
efficient jail diversion programs and reduce the number of individuals with
mental illness in the criminal justice system by directing them to
appropriate community treatment facilities. 3 At the same time, MHCs must

*
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1. Bruce J. Winick & Susan Stefan, A Dialogue on Mental Health Courts, 11 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y &
L. 507, 507 (2005).
2. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 202949, STATE PRISON
EXPENDITURES (2001), http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/ascii/spe01.txt. In 2001, state governments
spent $29.5 billion on prisoners, which included expenditures of only $3.3 billion on medical care for
that year – 12 % of operating costs. Id.
3. See generally Winick & Stefan, supra note 1, at 507.
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serve as only one branch of a larger, cohesive community effort to deter
individuals with mental illness from incarceration, if not from conviction. 4
Both advocates and adversaries of MHCs remain wary of the potential
misuse of mental health courts, which may subject people with mental
illness to greater criminalization or lead to greater fragmentation of the
mental health system. 5
Part II of this comment will discuss the existing issues that effectuate the
tension between the criminal justice system and mentally ill offenders,
which provides important context to the debate surrounding the
establishment of MHCs. Part III will examine the recent federal support for
alternative approaches to handling mentally ill offenders and the different
operational tactics implemented by existing MHC programs. Finally, Part
IV will study the launch of Virginia’s first MHC in Norfolk, while
exploring the latest legislative defeat in Virginia, Senate Bill 158 of the
2010 General Assembly, which sought to establish MHCs statewide. 6 The
recent bill proposed to allow general district courts and circuit courts to
voluntarily undertake separate mental health dockets. 7 However, the
Senate and the House were unable to agree on the methodology purported
by the bill. 8
II. THE BATTLE BETWEEN CRIMINAL LAW AND MENTAL ILLNESS
The strained relationship between the criminal justice system and the
mentally ill offender is largely due to complex, structural deficiencies in
community-based mental health care. 9 The lack of access to basic
treatment and support from the mental health system disconnects many
people with mental illness from community services. 10 Consequently, the
criminal justice system encounters mentally ill offenders “with increasing

4. See Robert Bernstein & Tammy Seltzer, Criminalization of People with Mental Illnesses: The Role of
Mental Health Courts in System Reform, 7 U. D.C. L. REV. 143, 143–44 (2003).
5. See MENTAL HEALTH AMERICA, POSITION STATEMENT 53: MENTAL HEALTH COURTS, (2009),
http://www.mentalhealthamerica.net/go/position-statements/53 [hereinafter POSITION STATEMENT 53].
6. Compare S.B. 158, 2010 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2010) (as introduced Jan. 13, 2010), with S.B.
158, 2010 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2010) (as amended Mar. 8, 2010).
7. S.B. 158, 2010 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2010) (as introduced Jan. 13, 2010) (proposing to
amend the Code of Virginia to include section 19.1-180.1, which would provide that any district court or
circuit court may establish an MHC through a separate court docket within the existing calendar of a
district or circuit court to offer judicial monitoring of the treatment and supervision of certain
individuals with mental illness who are under the jurisdiction of the criminal court).
8. Compare S.B. 158, 2010 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2010) (as introduced Jan. 13, 2010), with S.B.
158, 2010 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2010) (as amended Mar. 8, 2010).
9. Winick & Stefan, supra note 1, at 511.
10. See Bernstein & Seltzer, supra note 4, at 143. “For most, the underlying issue is their need for basic
services and supports that public systems have failed to deliver in meaningful ways.” Id.
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frequency.” 11 According to the most recent data compiled by the U.S.
Department of Justice, 16 percent of inmates in jails and prisons combined
reported having a mental condition or requiring mental health
hospitalization. 12 This translates to over a quarter-of-a-million individuals
with mental illness presently incarcerated. 13 Furthermore, studies by the
National Alliance for the Mentally Ill (“NAMI”) show that “up to 40
percent of adults who suffer from a serious mental illness will come into
contact with the American criminal justice system at some point in their
lives.” 14
Jails and prisons are not equipped to handle the growing presence of
mentally ill inmates. Reportedly one-fifth of jails have absolutely no access
to mental health services. 15 Senator Mike DeWine, who sponsored federal
legislation promoting MHC creation, 16 observed that “correctional facilities
simply do not have the means, or the expertise, to properly treat mentally ill
inmates.” 17 Due to inadequacies within the traditional criminal justice
system, 83 percent of mentally ill state prisoners and 89 percent of mentally
ill jail inmates do not receive treatment. 18 The few individuals who do
receive treatment must wait in long lines, with little incentive to participate,
and endure stigmatization. 19 Consequently, the inability of jails and prisons
to address the needs of people with mental illness contributes to the high
rate of recidivism.
Without the necessary treatment, most individuals re-offend and return to
the criminal justice system “going through a ‘revolving door’ from street to
court to cell and back again, without ever receiving the support and
structure they need” to keep from re-offending. 20 Currently, nearly one-

11. Id.
12. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 174463, MENTAL HEALTH AND
TREATMENT OF INMATES AND PROBATIONERS 1 (1999),
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/mhtip.pdf [hereinafter NCJ 174463].
13. Id. (“ . . . 16% or an estimated 283,800 inmates reported either a mental condition or an overnight
stay in a mental hospital, and were identified as mentally ill.”).
14. Pub. L. No. 108-414, § 2, 118 Stat. 2327, 2399 (2004) (finding, in accordance with the National
Alliance of the Mentally Ill, that 25%-40% of America's mentally ill come into contact with the criminal
justice system).
15. Debra Baker, A One-of-a-Kind Court May Offer the Best Hope for Steering Nonviolent Mentally Ill
Defendants into Care Instead of Jail, 84 A.B.A. J. 20, 21 (1998).
16. See supra text accompanying notes 32–36.
17. LeRoy L. Kondo, Advocacy of the Establishment of Mental Health Specialty Courts in the Provision
of Therapeutic Justice for Mentally Ill Offenders, 28 AM. J. CRIM. L. 255, 259 (2001) (citing Press,
Release, Mike DeWine, Treatment for Mentally Ill Inmates (Oct. 20, 1999), at 1).
18. DEREK DENCKLA & GREG BERMAN, CTR. FOR COURT INNOVATION, RETHINKING THE REVOLVING
DOOR: A LOOK AT MENTAL ILLNESS IN THE COURTS 3 (2001),
http://www.courtinnovation.org/_uploads/documents/rethinkingtherevolvingdoor.pdf.
19. Id.
20. DENCKLA & BERMAN, supra note 18, at 4. See also Kondo, supra note 17, at 257. (“Mentally ill
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fourth of prison and jail inmates who have a mental health problem have
served three or more prior incarcerations, as compared to a fifth of those
who are incarcerated without a mental illness. 21 Such high recidivism
among mentally ill offenders demonstrates the inefficient use of community
resources. Inadequate community mental health services prevent the
criminal justice system from achieving rehabilitation and deterrence for
these individuals. 22
In addition to setbacks within the public mental health system,
discriminatory practices by law enforcement officials greaten the
criminalization of those with mental illness, and thus also attribute to
recidivism. 23 In some jurisdictions, improper police response arises from
community pressures to remove individuals with mental illness from the
streets whose behaviors are seen as a nuisance to the public. 24 The stigma
associating mental illness with violence perpetuates “the prejudice of
communities that call on police to rid them of people they find
uncomfortable.” 25 Many of the individuals arrested are charged with only
minor offenses, such as disturbing the public order or trespassing, the
arrests for which are often contingent upon police discretion. 26 Under some
state statutes, the police may act as “street corner psychiatrists,” arresting
those with mental illness on the streets “as substitute intake procedures,
because arrest is deemed to be less burdensome that procedures for
emergency psychiatric intervention.” 27 Ultimately, the lack of police
training on how to deal with mental illness influences the inappropriate
criminal confinement of many individuals.

offenders are often inextricably trapped in a ‘revolving door’ of petty crime, incarceration, release,
homelessness, and re-imprisonment.”).
21. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 213600, MENTAL HEALTH
PROBLEMS OF PRISON AND JAIL INMATES 1 (2006),
http://www.bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/mhppji.pdf.
22. DENCKLA & BERMAN, supra note 18, at 4. “[U]pon release [from incarceration], [mentally ill
individuals] are often unable to access available community treatment because of providers’ reluctance
to serve them . . . . Many community mental health centers are unprepared or unwilling to treat people
who have criminal records.” Id.
23. See Winick & Stefan, supra note 1, at 513. “When Congress was considering the Americans With
Disabilities Act, testimony regarding discriminatory practices by police against people with disabilities
was so common that it was noted in the legislative history . . . [W]hen the Department of Justice didn't
include specific regulations addressing police practices, the drafters of the regulations received
numerous complaints. There have been literally hundreds of cases brought against prisons and jails for
their treatment of people with psychiatric disabilities.” Id. (internal citations omitted).
24. NCJ 174463, supra note 12. “Over one-quarter of the inmates with mental illnesses in local jails
were incarcerated for a public order offense.” Id.
25. Winick & Stefan, supra note 1, at 511.
26. See id. at 514–16 (discussing minor offenses observed by Florida’s Broward County MHC where
defendants were arrested for drinking a cup of coffee in front of a bank or shoplifting a pack of gum).
27. Kondo, supra note 17, at 306 (citing MENTAL HEALTH AND LAW: RESEARCH, POLICY AND
SERVICES 286, 288 (Bruce D. Sales & Saleem A. Shah eds., 1996)).
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Traditional criminal courts have different methods for addressing
defendants with mental illness, such as findings of “not guilty by reason of
insanity” or “guilty but mentally ill.” 28 Some believe the primary concern
for creating the “guilty but mentally ill” verdict was “to limit the number of
persons who, in the eyes of the legislature, were improperly being relieved
of all criminal responsibility by way of an insanity verdict.” 29 However,
state courts rarely explore such avenues, and criminal justice officials
occasionally treat these individuals worse than other defendants without
In some jurisdictions, defendants who are found
mental illness. 30
incompetent to stand trial may be transferred briefly to a local state
psychiatric hospital, typically to offer stabilizing treatment, and then back
to jail. 31 While the validity of state statutes allowing transfers from
reformatories to penal institutions have been upheld, the United States
Supreme Court has cautioned that, “the stigmatizing consequences of a
transfer to a mental hospital for involuntary psychiatric treatment, coupled
with the subjection of the prisoner to mandatory behavior modification as
treatment for mental illness, constitute the kind of deprivations of liberty
that require procedural protections” under the Due Process Clause. 32
Nevertheless, as the criminal justice system continues to flood with people
who have serious psychiatric disabilities, discriminatory practices within
the judicial process ensue. 33
III. THE GROWTH OF MENTAL HEALTH COURTS IN AMERICA
In a high-profile case in 1993, 25-year-old Aaron Wynn, who had been
in and out of community mental health facilities, pushed an 85-year-old

28. See Aizupitis v. Delaware, 699 A.2d 1092, 1092–93 (Del. 1997) (affirming that a statutory plea and
verdict of “guilty but mentally ill” may be invoked for the purpose of dealing with defendants who are
not legally insane, but who nevertheless suffer from mental illness); see also Ellis v. Georgia, 336
S.E.2d 281, 284 (Ga. Ct. App. 1985) (finding that a verdict of “guilty but mentally ill” is authorized
where the defendant is not legally insane, but is otherwise mentally ill at the time of his or her
commission of the alleged criminal acts); People v. Seaman, 561 N.E.2d 188, 190 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990)
(finding that before a jury may consider whether a defendant is guilty but mentally ill, it must have
determined that the defendant is sane rather than insane).
29. People v. Ramsey, 375 N.W.2d 297, 301 (Mich. 1985).
30. DENCKLA & BERMAN, supra note 18, at 6–7. “More often than not, defendants with mental illness
receive no special treatment whatsoever from the court — they are treated just like any other defendant.
In fact, many are treated worse, because they are stigmatized by criminal justice officials with little
experience dealing with mental illness.” Id.
31. Wilson v. Coughlin, 147 N.W.2d 175, 177 (Iowa 1966); Uram v. Roach, 37 P.2d 793, 793 (Wyo.
1934).
32. Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 494 (1980).
33. See generally Winick & Stefan, supra note 1, at 513 (discussing evidence of discriminatory
practices by the criminal justice system against individuals with mental illness).
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woman outside a supermarket in Fort Lauderdale. 34 The woman’s injuries
resulted in her death. Wynn was charged with manslaughter, but later found
incompetent to stand trial. 35 The case led to a grand jury investigation of
Florida’s mental health network, which revealed an ineffective and
fragmented system of care. 36 Frustrated by conventional approaches to
handling mentally ill offenders, Circuit Court Judge Mark A. Speiser in
Broward County established a Mental Health Task Force in 1994, which
soon became the nation’s first MHC by 1997. 37 Only two years later, King
County District Court in Washington established the second MHC in the
United States. 38 Both the King County and Broward County MHCs proved
to be great successes, and it was not long before Congress noticed the
benefits of supporting MHCs. 39
In 2000, Congress passed America’s Law Enforcement and Mental
Health Project statute to provide federal funds to local initiatives seeking to
establish or expand mental health specialty courts. 40 The grant program
may finance no more than 75 percent of the total costs to operate any
eligible MHC, and qualified applicants are limited to the chief executive or
chief justice of a state or of a unit of local government. 41 In 2004,
Congress broadened its support for MHCs by enacting the Mentally Ill
Offender Treatment and Crime Reduction Act (“MIOTCRA”). 42 The
MIOTCRA offers a more comprehensive approach by awarding
nonrenewable grants to be used to create or expand: (1) MHCs or related
specialized court-based systems, (2) programs offering “specialized training
to the officers and employees of a criminal or juvenile justice agency and
mental health personnel serving those with co-occurring mental illness and
34. Jenni Bergal, Justice That Works; Mentally Ill Defendants Avoid the Revolving Door of Jail, Get
Their Lives Back on Track Through Mental Health Court's Assistance, SUN-SENTINEL (Ft. Lauderdale,
Fla.), Nov. 24, 2002, at A1, available at http://articles.sun-sentinel.com/2002-1124/news/0211240176_1_judge-ginger-lerner-wren-mentally-ill-defendants-mental-health/3.
35. Id.
36. Id.; see also JUDGE GINGER LERNER-WREN, BROWARD'S MENTAL HEALTH COURT: AN
INNOVATIVE APPROACH TO THE MENTALLY DISABLED IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 2 (2000),
http://contentdm.ncsconline.org/cgi-bin/showfile.exe?CISOROOT=/spcts&CISOPTR=184 (discussing
the “scathing grand jury report” that revealed “severe shortfalls” in the county’s mental health system).
37. OFFICE OF JUSTICE SYSTEM SERVICES, BROWARD COUNTY MENTAL HEALTH CRIMINAL JUSTICE
TASK FORCE, THIRD ANNUAL MENTAL HEALTH COURT PROGRESS REPORT (2000), available at
http://web.archive.org/web/20010421092022/www.co.broward.fl.us/ojss/jsi00700.html.
38. FREDESE WHITSETT AND MARK C. CHOW, KING COUNTY DISTRICT COURT, MENTAL HEALTH
COURT 2001 REPORT (2001), available at
http://www.kingcounty.gov/courts/DistrictCourt/~/media/courts/DistrictCourt/pdfs/mhc2001rpt.ashx.
39. See America’s Law Enforcement and Mental Health Project, Pub. L. No. 106-515, § 2, 114 Stat.
2399, 2399 (2000) (lauding the “positive results” of Broward County, Florida and King County,
Washington’s MHCs).
40. Pub. L. No. 106-515, 114 Stat. 2399–2400 (2000).
41. §§ 2203-2205, 114 Stat at 2400–01.
42. Pub. L. No. 108-414, 118 Stat. 2327 (2004).
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substance abuse problems,” and (3) collaborative programs between
“criminal and juvenile justice agencies and mental health agencies to
promote public safety by offering mental health treatment services.” 43
Through these congressional acts, the Department of Justice launched a
number of programs to mobilize communities to address the criminalization
By 2008, news sources reported the
of mentally ill persons. 44
establishments of approximately 175 MHCs across the nation. 45
All MHCs exhibit a number of basic commonalities. State district courts
and circuit courts employ separate mental health dockets to maneuver the
judicial process to divert mentally ill offenders away from incarceration and
into treatment programs with the assistance of community mental health
services. 46 Every MHC involves a team-like approach by which court
personnel and mental health care professionals determine an appropriate
treatment plan tailored to the individual defendant. 47 Once the mentally ill
defendant agrees to accept diversion to mental heath court, the court holds
periodic hearings to ensure the participant’s compliance with the program
and resolve any difficulties that may arise during the treatment process. 48
MHCs feature therapeutic jurisprudence, 49 operating sensitive to the
psychological impacts of the law on individuals with mental illness. 50
These problem-solving courts apply a multi-disciplinary approach and act
as therapeutic agents “to motivate the individual to accept needed mental
health treatment and to encourage and monitor treatment compliance.” 51
Relaxed courtroom proceedings and supportive judge-participant
43. § 2991(b), 118 Stat. at 2330.
44. E.g., BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, MENTAL HEALTH COURT
PROGRAMS, http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/BJA/grant/mentalhealth.html (last visited Mar. 10, 2010).
45. Emma Schwartz, Mental Health Courts: How Special Courts Can Serve Justice and Help Mentally
Ill Offenders, U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT (Feb. 7, 2008), available at
http://www.usnews.com/articles/news/national/2008/02/07/mental-health-courts.html.
46. Stacey M. Faraci, Slip Slidin' Away? Will our Nation's Mental Health Court Experiment Diminish
the Rights of the Mentally Ill?, 22 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 811, 825 (2004).
47. Winick & Stefan, supra note 1, at 520.
48. Id. at 521. “The individual is encouraged to discuss his or her experiences and problems in
treatment. The hearing becomes an exercise in creative problem solving in which the judge and other
members of the treatment team attempt to resolve difficulties and overcome obstacles that have arisen in
the treatment process.” Id.
49. Professor David Wexler first coined the term therapeutic jurisprudence in 1987 in a paper to the
National Institute of Mental Health. Peggy Fulton Hora et al., Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the Drug
Treatment Court Movement: Revolutionizing the Criminal Justice System's Response to Drug Abuse and
Crime in America, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 439, 442 n.8 (1999).
50. See LAW IN A THERAPEUTIC KEY xvii (David B. Wexler & Bruce J. Winick eds., 1996). “Legal
rules, legal procedures, and the roles of legal actors (such as lawyers and judges) constitute social forces
that, like it or not, often produce therapeutic or antitherapeutic consequences. Therapeutic jurisprudence
proposes that we be sensitive to those consequences, and that we ask whether the law's antitherapeutic
consequences can be reduced, and its therapeutic consequences enhanced, without subordinating due
process and other justice values.” Id.
51. Winick & Stefan, supra note 1, at 521.
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interactions encourage modified behavior, 52 while judicial oversight and
centralized case management provide regular supervision and improve
efficacy. 53
In spite of the similarities described above, the operation of each MHC
program is unique. Each bench employs its own manner of balancing
concerns for public safety with the needs of the defendant. There are
currently three basic court models for using criminal charges to mandate
participation in community treatment: (1) the pre-adjudication model, (2)
the post-plea model, and (3) the probation-based model. 54 The preadjudication model defers prosecution upon the defendant’s decision to
participate in treatment, usually through a contractual agreement with the
judge. 55 The post-plea model, which is used by the majority of mental
health courts, occurs after adjudication. It requires a plea of guilt from the
defendant, but sentencing is deferred. 56 Lastly, the probation-based model
convicts the defendant and sentences him or her to probation, while
prescribing treatment as a condition of probation; the sentence may also
include suspended or deferred jail time. 57 Regardless of the model
selected, none of the courts dismiss the criminal charges prior to completion
of the treatment plan. 58
MHC programs encourage non-coercive and de-stigmatizing approaches,
as research shows that coercive standards may undermine treatment
compliance and reduce the overall effectiveness of jail diversion systems. 59
Judges, prosecutors, defense attorneys, and other members of the MHC
system work together to ensure that the mentally ill defendant has an
informed and voluntary choice to either participate in the treatment program
or opt for routine criminal court processing. 60 Some MHCs provide

52. See DENCKLA & BERMAN, supra note 17, at 9 (noting that MHCs have a non-adversarial dynamic).
53. Winick & Stefan, supra note 1, at 521. “The [mental health] judge at these hearings often functions
to help shape the individual's behavior by praising treatment compliance or sanctioning those who miss
appointments or otherwise fail to comply with the treatment program. The behavioral contract that the
individual enters into with the court typically specifies the details of required participation and the
sanctions that will be applied for noncompliance.” Id.
54. LISA CONTOS SHOAF, OHIO OFFICE OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE SERVICES, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ON
MENTAL HEALTH COURTS (2005), http://www.ocjs.state.oh.us/research/MHexec1.pdf.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. THE COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, A GUIDE TO MENTAL HEALTH COURT DESIGN AND
IMPLEMENTATION (May 2005), http://consensusproject.org/mhcp/GuideMHCDesign.pdf (this article
was prepared by the Bureau of Justice Statistics from a compilation of observations and reports to
explain the process and concerns of those wishing to establish mental health court programs).
60. See Berstein & Seltzer, supra note 4, at 150. “It is crucial from the outset that transfer to the mental
health court be entirely voluntary. Otherwise, singling out defendants with mental illnesses for separate
and different treatment by the courts would violate the equal protection guarantee of the 14th
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defendants with a temporary, two-week placement in the treatment program
to help them decide whether to participate in the program. 61 By the end of
the two-week period, the defendant must affirmatively “opt-in” in order to
continue receiving treatment. 62
Despite the successful implementation of MHCs across the country, the
alternative justice system is not without adversaries. 63 Although the
selective prosecution of mentally ill offenders calls for jail diversion
strategies, some fear that MHCs will further the criminalization of mental
illness by prompting more charges against “people with mental illness for
offenses for which they would not previously have been arrested.” 64 It has
also been contended that MHCs may “impose greater stigma upon [those
with mental illness], and result in a fragmentation of services, with those in
the criminal justice system ironically receiving priority access to needed
mental health services.” 65 Nevertheless, the development of MHCs
continues to spread in response to the continuing shortfalls of local mental
health delivery that agitate the problem of untreated mental illness in the
community.
IV. THE DEBATE IN VIRGINIA
Since 2007, Senator John Edwards has introduced four MHC bills to the
Virginia General Assembly during each regular session. 66 In the 2007 and
2008 sessions, the MHCs bills identically proposed a pilot program by
directing the Office of the Executive Secretary of the Supreme Court to
establish “at least two and no more than five mental health courts in the

Amendment and would likely violate the 6th Amendment right to a trial by jury and the prohibition
against discrimination by a state program found in the Americans with Disabilities Act.” Id.
61. See DENCKLA & BERMAN, supra note 18, at 10. “For instance, the King County Mental Health
Court in Washington gives defendants two weeks in a treatment placement to help them decide whether
to participate in the program or not.” Id.
62. See id.
63. E.g., Winick & Stefan, supra note 1, at 511. “The creation of mental health courts to solve the
problems represented by people with psychiatric disabilities in the criminal justice system is similar to
an unhappy teenager deciding to have a child to solve her problems.” Id.
64. See id. at 518. “There is a risk that mental health courts, if they are seen as an effective means of
facilitating the treatment of people in the communities who cause problems as a result of their untreated
mental illness, may prompt the police to begin arresting people with mental illness for offenses for
which they would not previously have been arrested. In other words, a successful mental health court
could have the effect of altering police arrest practices in the community aimed at dealing with people
with untreated mental illness who may cause trouble.” Id.
65. Id. at 508.
66. See S.B. 1388, 2007 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2007); S.B. 18, 2008 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess.
(Va. 2008); S.B. 854, 2009 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2009); S.B. 158, 2010 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess.
(Va. 2010).
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Commonwealth” within the following year. 67 The MHCs were to be
“established and administered so as to be eligible for any federal funding
that may become available under ‘America’s Law Enforcement and Mental
Health Project.’” 68 However, the proposed legislation did not move
forward from the Senate Finance Committee in either the 2007 or the 2008
session. The 2009 MHC bill mirrored the prior two bills, but included an
additional qualification mandating that MHCs only be established in those
circuits where “(i) the local community services board agrees to provide
such services as are necessary for the establishment of the mental health
court, and (ii) a district court or circuit agrees to establish a mental health
court.” 69 Although the bill passed in the Senate, it did not leave the House
Committee for Courts of Justice. 70
During the current 2010 regular session, Senate Bill 158 sought to enact
legislation requiring MHC establishment. 71 Such coercive legislation
proved once again to be too aggressive for House members to support. 72
Consequently, the House Committee for Courts of Justice offered a
substitute bill to enact indirect legislation that did not specifically mention
MHCs or their development. 73 Rather, the substitute proposed to amend
and reenact sections16.1-69.35 and 17.1-502 of the Code by simply
allowing a chief general district judge of to establish separate dockets
“when the work of the court may be more efficiently handled thereby.” 74
The House voted to pass the substitute; however, the Senate rejected it, and
the legislative debate on MHCs continues. 75
The MHC bills introduced to the General Assembly over the last four
years do not address a mental health program that is unknown to the
Commonwealth. In 2004, the Norfolk Circuit Court started Virginia’s first

67. S.B. 1388, 2007 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2007); S.B. 18, 2008 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Va.
2008).
68. S.B. 1388, 2007 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2007); S.B. 18, 2008 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Va.
2008).
69. S.B. 854, 2009 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2009).
70. See Legislative Information System, Bill Tracking: S.B. 854, 2009 Sess., http://leg1.state.va.us/cgibin/legp504.exe?ses=091&typ=bil&val=SB854.
71. S.B. 158, Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2010) (as introduced Jan. 13, 2010).
72. See Legislative Information System, Bill Tracking: S.B. 158, 2010 Sess., http://leg1.state.va.us/cgibin/legp504.exe?ses=101&typ=bil&val=sb158; cf. AUBREY FOX & ROBERT V. WOLF, CTR. FOR COURT
INNOVATION, THE FUTURE OF DRUG COURTS: HOW STATES ARE MAINSTREAMING THE DRUG COURT
MODEL 12–13 (2004), available at http://www.courtinnovation.org/pdf/future_of_drug_ courts.pdf
(discussing coercive legislation in the drug court context).
73. S.B. 158, Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2010) (as amended Mar. 10, 2010); cf. FOX & WOLF, supra
note 71, at 46 (discussing indirect legislation in the drug court context). For example, Ohio has no
legislation prescribing drug court operation, yet numerous laws support their process. Id.
74. S.B. 158, Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2010) (as amended Mar. 10, 2010).
75. See Legislative Information System, Bill Tracking: S.B. 158, 2010 Sess., http://leg1.state.va.us/cgibin/legp504.exe?ses=101&typ=bil&val=sb158
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MHC for mentally ill defendants charged with class one and class two
The Norfolk MHC coordinates with the Norfolk
misdemeanors. 76
Community Services Board (CSB) to devise individual treatment plans for
nonviolent mentally ill defendants who choose to participate in the
program. 77 Norfolk employs the probation-based model 78 of MHCs, where
after the defendant is charged and convicted of a non-violent offense, the
mentally ill offender may choose to participate in the MHC system. 79
Participants do not need to enter a guilty plea; however, they must be
convicted before they can apply to the program. 80 The applicant must also
undergo a screening process by a CSB representative and an Assistant
Commonwealth’s Attorney in order to determine eligibility. 81 Once the
program chooses to admit a participant, the court assigns a probation officer
and a mental health caseworker to monitor the participant’s compliance
with the treatment plan. 82 During scheduled court appearances, the judge
gives praise and encouragement to participants who stay on their regimen,
and imposes a set of graduated sanctions, including incarceration, in
instances of noncompliance and relapse. 83
A recent study by Old Dominion University’s Social Science Research
Center reveals that Norfolk’s MHC system successfully deters many
offenders from incarceration, while keeping them stabilized in treatment
programs and sober. 84 The study concluded that the six-year-old program
helps mentally ill offenders “achieve stability over an extended period
without incarceration and without risking public safety.” 85 The number of
days that program participants remained out of jail while in the program
was more than 21,000 during the study period, which ultimately saved the
Commonwealth approximately $1.63 million in jail costs. 86 The report also
found that the recidivism rate for program participants is significantly lower
than that of other mentally ill offenders. Recidivism rates ranged from 3.5
percent for those who graduated from the program within the last six

76. Matthew Philips, Norfolk Starts Virginia’s First Mental Health Court, VA. LAW. WKLY., Jan. 12,
2004, available at 2004 WLNR 22690153.
77. Id.
78. See SHOAF, supra note 54.
79. Here & Now: Special Criminal Courts for the Mentally Ill (Boston NPR broadcast July 6, 2009),
available at http://www.hereandnow.org/2009/07/3241/#2.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Debbie Messina, ODU Study Touts Success of Norfolk’s Mental Health Courts, THE VIRGINIANPILOT, Sept. 2, 2008, available at http://hamptonroads.com/2008/09/odu-study-touts-success-norfolksmental-health-courts.
85. Id.
86. Id.
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months to 30 percent for those who have been out of the program for two
years; whereas, the national rate of recidivism is “around 70 percent at two
years after release for mentally ill offenders who were not in such a
program.” 87
In spite of the encouraging results reported from Norfolk’s MHC,
legislative proposals to expand the court system continue to face rejection
by the General Assembly. Some lawmakers believe that “judges should not
be paid to ‘baby-sit’ drug addicts or the mentally ill.” 88 The hesitation
expressed by certain members of the General Assembly parallels the
uncertainty of numerous other state legislatures. Political orchestration
requires maneuvering around “thorny political issues,” such as selecting a
state agency to be responsible for the courts, promoting MHCs despite
alternative community approaches, and convincing policymakers to
continue supporting MHCs during economic downturns. 89 In short,
persuading Virginia legislators to support MHCs is crucial to the
development of such programs in the Commonwealth, especially since the
General Assembly controls appropriations.

V. CONCLUSION
The central goal of MHC systems is to lessen the incarceration of
individuals with mental illness. Mentally ill offenders often require
rehabilitation through treatment rather than incarceration. Problem-solving
courts aid rehabilitation by creating a supportive judicial environment,
while court-monitored treatment plans ensure compliance to prevent
recidivism. As described by one legal advocate:
These courts can screen mentally ill defendants for risk of violence,
seek to motivate those who are nonviolent to obtain needed
treatment, and facilitate their securing the treatment they need. Given
the assumed relationship between these individuals’ mental illness

87. Id.
88. Dena Potter, Mental Health Court Increase, ASSOCIATED PRESS, May 5, 2009, available at
http://www.myfoxtwincities.com/dpp/health/dpg_Mental_Health_Courts_fc_20090505_
2463149. Democrat Delegate Johnny S. Joannou stated, “I don't want to pay a judge $160,000 to
$175,000 a year to do a social issue when that's not what their job is.” Id.; cf. Winick & Stefan, supra
note 1, at 522. “Are the judges cast into these new roles always competent to perform them? Many are,
but many are not. Courts playing these new roles--dealing with such intractable problems as substance
abuse, domestic violence, child abuse and neglect, juvenile delinquency, and mental illness--are in many
ways functioning as social workers.” Id.
89. See FOX & WOLF, supra note 72, at 46 (discussing legislation's role in the proliferation of drug
courts).
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and their criminal behavior, these courts, by motivating and assisting
them to participate in treatment, also function to protect the
community from future crime. 90

The success stories reported from MHCs across the nation have yet to
overcome legislative setbacks in Virginia. Until policymakers can gather
state support for alternative programs, the Commonwealth’s criminal justice
system must convene to divert non-violent, mentally ill offenders to
community-based mental health services when incarceration is
inappropriate. Integrative system reform requires assertive collaboration
amongst both diversion programs and related liaisons. 91 To the extent that
MHCs are effective mechanisms for reducing the incarceration of
individuals with mental illness, their programs should provide additional
treatment resources for community mental health care, rather than exhaust
already limited existing resources. 92 Finally, the creation of MHCs in the
criminal justice system should not be an avoidance of the problem of
inadequate community mental health services. 93 While MHCs may be
helpful for filling in the gaps where comprehensive community outreach
programs fall short, such alternative court systems should never be the only
way, or even the primary way, to assure jail diversion.

90. Winick & Stefan, supra note 1, at 511.
91. See DENCKLA & BERMAN, supra note 18, at 10. “Mental health courts seek to promote reform with
partners outside of the courthouse as well as within. For instance, mental health courts have encouraged
mental health and drug treatment providers to come together to improve service delivery for offenders.”
Id.
92. Winick & Stefan, supra note 1, at 511.
93. E.g., id. Stefan makes the analogy that the creation of MHCs to address mentally ill defendants in
the criminal justice system is “similar to an unhappy teenager deciding to have a child to solve her
problems.”

